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here are many possible definitions of ‗e-democracy‘, to the point that the term is perhaps 
suffering from its misapplication to cases where is simply describes the provision of services by 
governments to citizens via online media. For the purposes of this article, we utilise a broad 
definition of e-democracy as the active participation of citizens in the public discussion and 
deliberation of matters of public concern and policy, and in the organisation of communal activities 
and initiatives to address such matters, through the use of online, digital media. 
This definition inherently highlights the importance of active participation – meaning not simply 
access to information, but direct and productive engagement with it, in turn generating material 
(ideas, comments, contributions) which may again be shared with other participants using the 
same or additional online media spaces. The quality of such active participation in e-democracy, 
much like the quality of active user participation in any other online space, depends on the 
sustained presence of a substantial community of users (and the sustainability of their presence for 
these users, in the face of other personal and professional demands on their time which they may 
experience in their everyday lives). 
Studies of online communities (e.g. Bruns, 2008; Baym, 2000), and indeed of communities in 
general (e.g. Hebdige, 1979) have demonstrated that one key prerequisite for the establishment 
and sustainability of functioning communities is the development of a balance between a shared 
purpose – a common community credo which all members of the community can subscribe to at 
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least to some extent – and a sufficient diversity of ideas and opinions within the community – to 
generate new and unexpected impulses and thus save the community from developing a 
predictable, stifling tendency to follow a common ‗groupthink‘ pattern. This requirement also has 
direct implications for the structure of the community itself: though it is common that from ongoing 
processes of participation, key members will emerge from the community, bestowed with greater 
social capital and higher levels of authority than rank-and-file participants, these community 
leaders must not be allowed to establish positions of such unassailable authority that they are 
placed in a position to determine ‗groupthink‘ and direct the course of discussion within the 
community. Instead, the participant community must remain permeable for new members who are 
prepared to contribute constructively to continuing deliberative processes, and must hold the 
promise that through sustained participation such new members, too, will be able to accumulate 
social capital and advance to positions of authority within the community. Indeed, such promise of 
community recognition, and the aspects of competition with other participants which are associated 
with it, can – as long as such competition is not allowed to supplant topical discussion as the 
principal driver of participation in the community – act as a significant incentive for members to 
contribute to the community activities (also see Bruns, 2009). 
These interrelated dynamics of communal discussion and personal status are clearly internal to 
the community itself, regardless of whether that community exists as an offline association of 
individuals or an online group of users, or both; any technological support structures for the 
community, for example in the form of dedicated online discussion and collaboration spaces for 
community members, can only aim to guide and support such internal processes (or at the very 
least, to avoid stifling or counteracting them), not to create them from scratch. This is an important 
point especially also for community building projects within the e-democracy field: the ultimate aim 
of such projects should usually be to enable self-determined, self-directed, and above all self-
motivated communities to manifest themselves, rather to develop spaces where any sense of 
shared purpose (and thus, of community itself) remains dependent on the artificial interventions of 
project staff. From a practical perspective, not least also considering the inherent vagaries of 
funding and staffing for e-democracy activities, projects whose participant communities do not 
develop their internal momentum to the point that they become self-sustaining are likely to fail – 
and the long list of defunct projects in this area is a clear indication of how difficult such continuous 
momentum is to achieve. 
These difficulties are also closely associated with the problems of ownership which such projects 
will face. While potentially afforded a more direct connection with policymakers, e-democracy 
projects operated by government departments and institutions may be subject to tight operational 
controls and governance regulations, substantially limiting the degree of freedom of self-
determination which can be provided to the participant community; by contrast, projects operated 
by independent civil society organisations may benefit from a substantially greater operational 
freedom, but conversely their relative lack of accountability to recognised authorities also enables 
official stakeholders to more easily dismiss their outcomes as partisan and non-representative.  
Bruns & Swift (2010) have suggested that this ―atmosphere of crisis [that] surrounds virtual 
deliberation and indirect representation in the early 21st century‖ (Coleman, 2005a, p. 195), which 
results from the limitations of both government-to-citizen (g2c) and citizen-to-citizen (c2c) models, 
may be able to be addressed at least in part by exploring hybrid solutions which seek government 
support for (and participation in) citizen-to-citizen spaces – a g4c2c model whose arms‘-length 
government involvement mirrors to some extent the hands-off government support for public 
service broadcasting in many developed nations. Indeed, applying the PSB model to e-democracy 
more literally, in 2001 Blumler & Coleman called for the establishment of a ‗Civic Commons‘, 
operated as a public-held institution in analogy to the BBC: 
Keynotes 37 
―Our proposal for a civic commons in cyberspace aims to create an enduring structure which 
could realise more fully the democratic potential of the new interactive media. This would 
involve the establishment of an entirely new kind of public agency, designed to forge fresh 
links between communication and politics and to connect the voice of the people more 
meaningfully to the daily activities of democratic institutions. The organisation would be 
publicly funded but be independent from government. It would be responsible for eliciting, 
gathering, and coordinating citizens' deliberations upon and reactions to problems faced and 
proposals issued by public bodies (ranging from local councils to parliaments and government 
departments), which would then be expected to react formally to whatever emerges from the 
public discussion. This should encourage politicians and officials to view the stimulation of 
increased participation not as mere `citizens' playgrounds' but as forums in which they must 
play a serious part.‖ (2001, p. 15) 
However, such earlier calls for the development of a stand-alone public agency for e-democracy 
may have fallen prey to the early-2000s, pre-Web 2.0 enthusiasm for building new online 
platforms. The proliferation of e-democracy platforms (driven in part by the various competing 
funding schemes for online projects which are available to civil society organisations, academic 
researchers, Web developers, and government agencies) may also have resulted in a dilution of 
existing public enthusiasm for participating in such spaces, and thus diminishes these 
communities‘ chances of success, as it has become increasingly difficult to predict which of the 
many projects in existence today will remain in active operation in the longer term – beyond the 
initial startup publicity. At the same time, this still-prevalent ‗roll your own‘ mentality also obscures 
the fact that there are a number of very well-established, long-term sustainable spaces for online 
community participation which have as yet been under-utilised for e-democracy purposes – from 
thematic sites such as Wikipedia, Flickr, and YouTube to generic social media sites like Twitter and 
Facebook. While public broadcasters and similar government-authorised but independently-run 
organisations may play an important role as facilitators of g4c2c engagement processes, therefore, 
they may need to do so through their activities on extant social media platforms rather than only 
through their own Websites. Updating their 2001 ‗Civic Commons‘ vision to a Web 2.0-compatible 
model, Coleman & Blumler therefore describe this ‗Civic Commons 2.0‘ as ―a space of intersecting 
networks, pulled together through the agency of a democratically connecting institution‖ (2009, p. 
182). What such proposals aim at, then, is the development of modes of citizen participation that 
are distributed – yet nonetheless also coordinated – across the various Web 2.0 platforms which 
citizens are already using, rather than centralised in a purpose-built environment that potential 
users would first need to sign up to. 
1. Acute Events and Social Media 
Just how this ‗space of intersecting networks‘ might be structured in practice still remains unclear 
from this overall discussion, however – and indeed, in practice the answers to that question may 
be as diverse as the potential issues and topics which such Civic Commons 2.0 spaces may aim to 
address. However, recent events provide a number of highly instructive pointers to possible 
configurations of the Civic Commons 2.0 space – in particular, a class of events which might be 
best described as ‗acute events‘ (Burgess, 2010): crises and other rapidly developing events which 
generate a substantial level of ad hoc community engagement in online environments. 
From a research perspective, the rapidity with which such events – and their online responses – 
develop has the benefit of bypassing or leapfrogging, at least temporarily, most organisational or 
administrative hurdles which may otherwise frustrate the establishment of online communities, and 
of fast-tracking the processes of community development and structuration; within hours or days, 
large communities with complex internal structures that extend across a range of intersecting 
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online platforms and draw on a variety of technological tools can be established. Such 
communities are largely self-organising, exhibit substantial levels of participant engagement, and 
may generate significant outcomes in terms of ideas and information; their development can be 
understood as a process of rapid prototyping as various members of the community take the 
initiative to explore the use of new tools for gathering, compiling, processing, and sharing the 
information that is circulating within the community – those tools which are found to be useful to the 
greater community are retained and developed further, while those which do not meet significant 
acceptance are quietly discarded again. 
E-democracy initiatives may benefit from observing community responses to such acute events 
in a number of ways, then. On the one hand, what technological tools and organisational 
processes are found to be useful and valuable there may also be able to be adopted and adapted 
to these initiatives‘ own needs; similarly, the participation and conduct of official actors as part of 
the wider community can be critically reviewed, and may provide insight for the further fine-tuning 
of the social media engagement strategies that are in use in such institutions; finally, some e-
democracy projects may even be able to structure their overall operations around a series of 
scheduled ‗acute events‘ (for example highlighting particular themes and topics) that attract 
specific groups of participants, rather than simply providing an open-ended space for discussion 
and deliberation that is functional but provides its potential users with little reason for why they 
should address any one specific topic at any one given time. 
With these intentions, then, the following discussion will examine two recent acute events: the 
2010/11 Queensland flood crisis, and the (continuing) controversy around WikiLeaks and its 
founder and spokesman, Julian Assange. Clearly, these events differ in a number of key elements 
– underlying themes, geographic reach, temporal dynamics, the involvement of government 
agencies and other institutions, etc. –, but both provide vital pointers for e-democracy projects. 
1.1. The Queensland Floods 
The Australian state of Queensland received an unprecedented amount of rainfall during 
December 2010 and January 2011, resulting in widespread flooding across large areas – a flood 
emergency was declared for half of the Queensland territory, with an area the size of France and 
Germany combined estimated to be under water. Additionally, while early flooding occurred in the 
relatively sparsely populated west of the state, later floods affected larger regional populations 
centres like Rockhampton, on the central Queensland coast, and further heavy rain finally caused 
widespread flooding in the state‘s southeast corner, where major towns Toowoomba, Ipswich, and 
finally the state capital Brisbane were severely affected. Arguably, the flood peak in Brisbane, in 
the early hours of 13 January 2011, also marks the peak of the overall flood crisis in Queensland; 
in Brisbane alone, some 30,000 properties were partially inundated by floodwaters.  
As a major environmental crisis, the floods were of course covered extensively by the Australian 
and international mainstream media. Especially as they began to affect major population centres, 
however, social media such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as content sharing sites Flickr and 
YouTube which were used by many locals to distribute first-hand footage of the situation in their 
local areas, also began to play an important role. In this, the southeast Queensland flood events 
must perhaps be considered separately from the wider inundation of other parts of the state, as 
events here developed a somewhat more urgent dynamic: while flooding in central Queensland 
followed a familiar pattern of relatively gradual river level rises which – while nonetheless 
devastating for affected residents and businesses – usually leave sufficient time for warnings and 
evacuations, a number of southeast Queensland towns, starting with the regional centre of 
Toowoomba, experienced rapid and devastating flash flooding which caused small creeks to swell 
to raging torrents within minutes, carrying off cars and other heavy items without warning. Here, 
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following a pattern established in other unforeseen disaster events, social media played an 
important role in capturing and disseminating first-hand footage of the flash floods, in effect 
operating as an unofficial, distributed early warning system; later, social media users also shared 
further links to mainstream news reports and footage of the destruction caused by the same torrent 
in the Lockyer Valley below Toowoomba. The floodwaters washing through the area made their 
way to the downstream cities of Ipswich and Brisbane over the following 48 hours. 
As these initial reports of devastation heightened flood fears in Ipswich and Brisbane, social 
media became an increasingly important element of the flood mobilisation efforts. On Twitter, the 
#qldfloods hashtag rapidly emerged as a central mechanism for coordinating discussion and 
information exchange related to the floods (hashtags are appended to tweets in order to make 
them more easily findable for other users, and many Twitter client applications provide the 
functionality to automatically receive all messages using a specific hashtag); while other hashtags 
such as #bnefloods (for information specifically relating to the Brisbane aspects of the overall 
Queensland flood crisis) or, with characteristic Australian humour in the face of adversity, 
#thebigwet were also used by some participants, they were unable to establish themselves as 
equally prominent alternatives – most likely indicating that Twitter users were concerned to avoid 
any fracturing of the discussion into several disconnected subsets.  
Notably, too, the Twitter accounts of several official sources quickly adopted the #qldfloods 
hashtag for their own tweets. Indeed, the social media use of several of these organisations 
underwent a rapid development process as the emergency unfolded; this is best illustrated using 
the example of the official Facebook and Twitter accounts of the Queensland Police Service 
(QPS). Initially, QPS had mainly shared its own advisories and news updates through its Facebook 
page, with messages automatically crossposted to Twitter. This was problematic for a number of 
reasons, however: first, the lower 140 character limit for messages on Twitter, compared to 
Facebook, caused several of these crossposted messages to be truncated and thus unusable 
(especially when embedded hyperlinks were broken in the process); additionally, this also meant 
that users on Twitter may first have had to navigate from Twitter to Facebook, to see the full, 
original message, and then to follow any embedded links to their eventual destination; and even 
this may only have been possible for users who already had Facebook accounts. Further, for 
reasons of site design, Facebook messages are more difficult to share with a larger number of 
users than those on Twitter, where a simple click of the ‗retweet‘ button passes on an incoming 
message to all of one‘s followers; and similarly, ongoing conversations are more difficult to manage 
on Facebook – where the amount of commentary attached to each of the QPS‘s posts was rapidly 
swamping important information – than on Twitter; indeed, Facebook knows no equivalent to the 
concept of the hashtag, which allows a large number of users to conduct an open, ongoing, public 
discussion centred around a common topic. These shortcomings were quickly (and courteously) 
explained to the QPS media staff by a number of vocal Twitter users, and the QPS used both its 
Facebook page and its @QPSmedia Twitter account in equal measure throughout the rest of the 
flood crisis; in fact, @QPSmedia received by far the most @replies from other users in the 
#qldfloods community during the four key days of 11 to 14 January 2011: 
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Fig. 1: @replies (including old-style „RT @user‟ retweets) to #qldfloods users during 11-14 Jan. 2011 
Fig. 1 also indicates the continuing importance of institutional sources during this event: in addition 
to @QPSmedia, other prominently featured accounts are those of the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation (ABC)‘s @abcnews, Brisbane newspaper @couriermail, breakfast TV show 
@sunriseon7, local ABC radio station @612brisbane, @TheQldPremier, Brisbane online 
newspaper @brisbanetimes, commercial TV news @7NewsBRISBANE, and the Brisbane City 
Council‘s @brisbanecityqld, inter alia. A full analysis of the nature of the @replies to these 
institutional Twitter users is beyond the scope of this article – some @replies to news agencies 
may have complained about incorrect information in their coverage, for example, while other 
notable accounts (such as that of popstar Pink) are featured prominently here only because their 
general messages of support were widely retweeted by their followers – but this graph provides at 
least a basic overview of the distribution of attention within the overall #qldfloods community (also 
see Bruns, 2011). 
It should be noted that a number of these accounts, especially again including the @QPSmedia 
account, were also active in responding to messages from other Twitter users, and/or in retweeting 
their messages; this reciprocity will have further cemented their position in the centre of the overall 
network. Additionally, some Twitter users also set up dedicated accounts to retweet and thus 
further disseminate important information (@thebigwetfeed, @qldfloodfeed), or utilised their 
existing account to retweet whatever authoritative information they found worth passing on. 
Anecdotally, this appeared to be the preferred activity for users who were following the flood crisis, 
but had no first-hand information or advice of their own to pass on; the dedicated retweet accounts 
also provided a means for Twitter users to follow a vetted subset of the flood information on Twitter 
without having to deal with the entire volume of #qldfloods messages. 
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Such phenomena point to the substantial level of instant community self-organisation on Twitter 
(and in other social media spaces) at the height of the crisis. Once #qldfloods had become clearly 
established as the central gathering mechanism for flood-related information, it began to be used 
to report what major roads had been closed or were still open; to call for assistance or supplies 
(from sandbags to medical equipment) in specific locations; to coordinate flood response activities; 
to point to important online resources (such as Google Maps of road closures or expected flood 
levels); and, importantly, to debunk any rumours which had begun to spread. Indeed, in addition to 
(and combined with) the overall #qldfloods hashtag, the Queensland Police Service also regularly 
posted its #Mythbuster tweets, directly addressing various rumours (from stories that Brisbane‘s 
Wivenhoe Dam had burst to suggestions that its near-critical level could be reduced by getting all 
Brisbane residents to turn on their taps). 
On Twitter, hashtag functionality clearly played an important role on a number of fronts, then – 
both for coordinating the #qldfloods discussion overall, and for highlighting individual aspects of it. 
In addition to the #Mythbuster hashtag, others especially addressed specific suburbs (such as 
#Rosalie, #Chelmer) or connected the flood discussion with relevant other communities (e.g. by 
including #Auslan in a call for interpreters, to seek the attention of Australian sign language users). 
Rank-and-file users also took care to repost information from the authorities under additional 
hashtags if the original tweets had not been properly hashtagged themselves. That said, attempts 
to introduce a somewhat more complicated hashtag syntax aimed to enable the automatic 
processing of tweets for a collaborative map of the flood situation appeared to be only marginally 
successful. While a number of tweets like 
#loc Gailey Road Taringa #CLOSED near 5'ways roundabout. Police presnt. #Bnefloods 
#qldfloods #thebigwet 
were made by #qldfloods participants, they were not particularly prominent – most likely because 
the absence of readily available tools (including smartphone applications) to generate this syntax 
meant that users would have had to memorise and manually enter these standard codes while 
creating their tweets (the GPS functionality available with modern smartphones was similarly rarely 
used; in Australia, this is true during non-crisis periods, too). 
As important as the use of Twitter and Facebook themselves during the flood events was their 
use for pointing to further online resources, too – with such resources including many pre-existing 
sites such as the Website of the Australian Bureau of Meteorology (BOM), which provides up-to-
the-minute weather radar and river level observations as well as forecasts and warnings for a wide 
range of locations, the sites of Brisbane City Council and Queensland State Government, and the 
sites of major infrastructure providers (such as electricity and telephone companies). But beyond – 
and in addition to – such official sources, the flood event also saw the rapid establishment of a 
number of user-initiated online resources: some sites were set up to mirror official sites whose 
servers were struggling to cope with the increased amount of page requests; some pulled together 
the information from a variety of sources in a faster and more user-friendly format (for example by 
marking road closures on Google Maps, or providing a simple list of links to flood forecast maps); 
some set up eyewitness sites providing photos, videos, and even live Webcam footage of the rising 
Brisbane river. Some such activities also incorporated information from open data resources made 
available by Australian governments at various levels as part of their Government 2.0 initiatives. 
Many such activities also carried over – if at lower volume and visibility – into the post-flood 
cleanup period (which is continuing at the time of writing, and has been estimated by the Brisbane 
Lord Mayor to take up to two years); here, social media have been used to provide and/or link to 
information on road conditions and the restoration of electrical, phone, public transport, rubbish 
collection, and other essential services; to advise on the availability of refugee shelters and other 
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council facilities; to call for and organise cleanup volunteers, and provide advice on cleaning 
homes and salvaged household items; and to organise support for specific localities or community 
groups. The post-flood era has also seen a further diversification of Twitter hashtags, now that 
#qldfloods is no longer an appropriate description: alongside #bnecleanup, suburb names and 
other more specific hashtags have also been used to coordinate more localised activities. Similarly, 
on Facebook a wide range of pages organising donations of funds and supplies as well as 
coordinating various local, interstate and overseas support activities have been set up. 
Overall, what has been particularly notable in the Queensland (and here, especially the 
southeast Queensland and Brisbane) flood events has been the relatively responsive structure of 
engagement between ‗official‘ social media accounts and ‗everyday‘ users – in good part 
stemming, no doubt, from a sense that ‗we‘re all in this together‘, and from the realisation that any 
successful flood response both during and after the acute event itself would necessarily have to 
rely on the broad-scale mobilisation of the Brisbane community. This sense of community, across 
the majority of institutional and individual participants in these social media spaces, was also 
maintained in significant ways by the reposting of valuable information from users on the ground by 
the official institutional accounts. The joint effort by the southeast Queensland community to 
respond to the flood threat, and the overwhelming response by local and even interstate residents 
to calls for cleanup volunteers (to the extent that volunteer centres were at times overloaded with 
people offering to help) was not simply or predominantly a result of the social media activities 
which we have described here, of course – the authorities‘ efforts to manage the crisis through 
other media also played an important, and most probably more important, part. What it does point 
to, however, is the crucial importance of engaging with citizens through whatever channels are 
available, accessible, and effective – regardless of whatever communicative preferences may have 
existed in government organisations before the event. Indeed, one key observation to be made 
about the distributed, multi-channel media response to the Queensland floods is that citizens and 
officials together determined the media mix, and continued to fine-tune it as the event unfolded; the 
substantial shift which we have observed in the Queensland Police Service‘s media practices 
during the flood crisis provides just one key example here. This successful emergency response 
was also a success of e-democracy, therefore.  
As Coleman & Blumler point out, 
―effective democracy depends upon governments at every level being held to account and 
responding to those it claims to represent. For this to happen, there need to be channels of 
common discourse between the official and informal political spheres.‖ (2009, p. 136) 
Social media provided one such channel of common discourse between Queensland citizens and 
their government institutions, and – with the permission and indeed with the active help and 
support of citizens – the various accounts of these institutions were able to place themselves in key 
positions within the social networks emerging around the flood crisis, but only because they chose 
to engage and respond rather than simply push out information. Only the support of other users – 
through retweets and other means of sharing and distributing information – provided these 
accounts with the social capital to guide and direct the overall community effort. 
Even in spite of this generally positive assessment, however, it should also be noted that this 
mobilisation of community responses to the flood crisis was ultimately not entirely successful. More 
could have been done sooner – to protect more properties from flood damage by sandbagging 
them, to remove more household items from flood-threatened properties, to evacuate more 
residents before the flood reached Brisbane. For many residents, it seems, their trust in official 
advice, and their willingness to follow it, was only fully established once the flood danger was 
highly imminent, and any beliefs that the authorities had exaggerated the threat could no longer be 
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sensibly sustained. Whether the heightened trust in government authorities and the spirit of 
collaboration and joint problem-solving which this crisis is likely to have generated will last into the 
future, and whether it may be mobilised again in support of other e-democracy activities, remains 
to be seen. 
1.2. WikiLeaks 
The global controversy around the WikiLeaks whistleblower site – and here, especially the 
intense attention devoted to it in the wake of its gradual publication of leaked US diplomatic cables, 
which started in late 2010 and is still continuing – makes for a very different case study of citizen 
mobilisation and participation, of course. Where in the Queensland floods case, state authorities 
and ‗average‘ citizens were largely pulling together in their effort to address the flood threat and 
cleanup task, here a very obvious fault line emerges between government interests and citizen 
activities. While the online response to the Queensland floods can be seen as originating in the 
g2c sphere, then (with key emergency services providing vital information to citizens, and a 
broader network of mutual support and cooperation rapidly emerging around those central nodes, 
eventually approximating a g4c2c structure), in the WikiLeaks case activities must be characterised 
as predominantly involving c2c engagement, with very little direct government participation – let 
alone support. 
Indeed, even the exact nature of the organisational structures at the centre of the WikiLeaks 
phenomenon remains nebulous, due not least to the secrecy which surrounds WikiLeaks as an 
entity itself. Indeed, media coverage especially of the ‗cablegate‘ affair has tended to reductively 
identify WikiLeaks mainly with its controversial founder and self-described editor-in-chief Julian 
Assange – perhaps exactly because in and of itself, the WikiLeaks organisation has remained so 
intangible –, but this focus on Assange (and his personal circumstances) has tended to obscure 
the fact that even while Assange himself was remanded in custody by British authorities on 
allegations of sexual assault, WikiLeaks‘ publication of US cables continued unabatedly. Evidently, 
then, while he remains an important figurehead and media representative for the site, WikiLeaks‘ 
day-to-day operation does not depend on Assange‘s direct involvement. 
Beyond Assange himself, then, the WikiLeaks Website itself (and its staff) are at the centre of 
the c2c effort which sustains WikiLeaks. Founded in 2006, the site has been positioned as a safe 
harbour for leaked documents of various provenance, legal status, and format, usually granting 
immediate access to entire document collections made available to it; notably, its gradual release 
of the diplomatic cables since November 2010 diverts from its standard modus operandi – indeed, 
Greenwald (2010) estimates that as of December 2010, less than one percent of the total cable 
collection had been released publicly. Additionally, the cable release is also unusual in that 
WikiLeaks is operating in direct partnership with a number of major media organisations around the 
globe – chiefly, The Guardian, The New York Times, Der Spiegel, Le Monde, and El País – which 
appear to be granted access to the cable contents before they are made public on the site itself. 
While little reliable information on this matter is available, we may speculate that these 
partnerships are designed to enable WikiLeaks to influence the news agenda at least to some 
extent, maintaining a focus on the contents of the cables rather than merely on the legal 
prosecution of Julian Assange. 
The central position of the WikiLeaks site within the wider network that surrounds it is 
comparable to the similar positioning of other online c2c initiative sites within their respective 
networks, with similar implications – while such sites are able to provide some degree of leadership 
for the movements they aim to coordinate, they also provide a single point of failure that may 
threaten the overall enterprise. This became obvious in the WikiLeaks case in the wake of several 
attempts to shut down the site or undermine its operations – for example when content host 
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Amazon Web Services (AWS) or domain name service EasyDNS withdrew their support for the 
site. These actions demonstrated how centrally the discoverability and availability of Websites to 
the wider public depends on such crucial infrastructure services, and their disabling is therefore an 
obvious strategy for interested parties wishing to disable a site. 
However, the WikiLeaks case also saw a range of immediate counteractions by a loose coalition 
of WikiLeaks supporters and sympathisers, during which various alternative DNS services and 
content mirrors for the main WikiLeaks site were established across a distributed network of 
servers. Although beyond the scope of this paper, a useful comparison of this response to what 
was regarded by many supporters as a direct attack on WikiLeaks by government authorities, 
through these service providers as intermediaries, with the response to the attacks by music 
industry bodies on Napster (as the central point of failure of early, centrally coordinated filesharing 
networks) that saw the adoption of Bittorrent and similar technologies as distributed alternatives for 
filesharing, would be instructive: in both cases, far from disabling these networks, the attacks on 
their central nodes led to a rapid decentralisation of network structures which has made them more 
resistant to future attacks. (Similar to the music industry‘s focus on suing individual filesharers, the 
recent focus on exploring Assange‘s personal culpability for revealing state secrets, rather than on 
pursuing WikiLeaks as the organisation responsible for doing so, also demonstrates this shift.) 
Other practical contributions to the WikiLeaks effort – especially in relation to the release of the 
diplomatic cables – include the development of various advanced tools for the searching, filtering, 
and processing of WikiLeaks contents. Writing in Wired Magazine, for example, Shachtman (2010) 
reports on new tools for visualising the progress of the Afghan War by drawing on the data 
contained in the Afghanistan War Logs, which WikiLeaks had released earlier in the year: 
 
Fig. 2: Visualisation of the progress of the Afghan War, 2004-9, by Drew Conway (2010) 
Such efforts also mirror similar forms of user-driven, crowdsourced processing of large public 
datasets elsewhere – notably, for example, The Guardian‘s harnessing of its readership in sifting 
through the expenses records of UK Members of Parliament, which it had obtained under Freedom 
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of Information legislation, as part of its investigation into the parliamentary expenses scandal. 
Ultimately, they employ the same overall logic as do the open data initiatives – data.gov, 
data.gov.uk, et al. – which have been instituted by various governments around the world. 
A very different form of community mobilisation around WikiLeaks is also evident in the 
emergence of a self-styled online guerrilla which has orchestrated coordinated attacks against a 
variety of entities rightly or wrongly perceived as WikiLeaks‘s ‗enemies‘ – including, for example, 
Amazon Web Services and EasyDNS, as well as Paypal and Mastercard (both of which stopped 
the transfer of public donations to WikiLeaks at least temporarily). This guerrilla is led by the more 
militant core of Anonymous, a nebulous group of hackers, organising its activities through Internet 
Relay Chat and other online fora, which has a lengthy history of actions against a wide range of 
online targets. In support of its WikiLeaks-related activities, Anonymous has made available a 
public toolset that allows everyday sympathisers of WikiLeaks to participate in coordinated 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks – a well-known method for overloading Web servers 
with page requests, thereby causing them to crash and their hosted Websites to be unavailable. 
More broadly, efforts in support of WikiLeaks range from such drastic activist activities – which 
could be characterised as electronic warfare, but also as an online equivalent of picketing 
businesses – to more conventional forms of showing support: the establishment of online and 
offline support groups, public rallies, and financial donations to fund both WikiLeaks as such and 
Assange‘s legal defence in particular. Especially the latter activities have also attracted a number 
of celebrity supporters – from lawyer Geoffrey Robertson, who is supporting Assange‘s defence 
team, to filmmaker Michael Moore. Additionally, social media have also been used in significant 
ways to distribute information about WikiLeaks‘ (and its opponents‘) activities and Assange‘s legal 
case, well beyond (and to some extent in direct response to) their mainstream journalistic 
coverage. The use of both Facebook and Twitter by a large and diverse community of interested 
users to share information about these issues demonstrates the role of these social media 
platforms in facilitating what Hermida has described as ―ambient journalism‖: ―a multi-faceted and 
fragmented news experience, where citizens are producing small pieces of content that can be 
collectively considered as journalism. ... In this sense, Twitter becomes part of an ambient media 
system where users receive a flow of information from both established media and from each 
other‖ (2010). 
However we might assess the social utility of WikiLeaks‘s core activities, then, it becomes clear 
that along with the support movement which it has managed to generate, the site can be seen as 
an example of a successful c2c e-democracy initiative – whose closest parallels amongst 
‗accepted‘ e-democracy projects are, perhaps, initiatives such as MoveOn in the US or GetUp in 
Australia. Such projects utilise their central Websites as rallying points for citizen engagement and 
activism, as well as to ask for donations and other expressions of support; they provide the tools 
for their members and sympathisers to organise online and offline activities in support of specific 
causes, as well as for seeking and collating the information available from open datasets; and they 
encourage the formation of self-sustaining spin-off groups and initiatives well beyond the core site 
itself. They are, in other words, aiming to maximise the distribution of their messages by 
encouraging the development of a distributed, multi-channel, multi-platform, self-organising 
network of supporters and participants – a network which, in WikiLeaks‘ case, also minimises the 
risk of technological failure. Additionally, they seek the endorsement of celebrity champions and 
partnerships with media organisations in order to gain greater authority and maximise the 
dissemination of their messages – but this media exposure, which draws attention to spokespeople 
and other leaders, can also threaten to undermine the largely bottom-up organisation of the 
project. 
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Similarly, like these activist organisations, WikiLeaks, too – if we take its statements at face 
value – aims to affect the political process by encouraging public discussion and debate on a 
strong evidential basis. Its mission statement directly links the leaking of secret information to the 
idea of open government: 
―The power of principled leaking to call governments, corporations and institutions to account 
is amply demonstrated through recent history. The public scrutiny of otherwise unaccountable 
and secretive institutions forces them to consider the ethical implications of their actions. ... 
Open government answers injustice rather than causing it. Open government exposes and 
undoes corruption. Open governance is the most effective method of promoting good 
governance.‖ (WikiLeaks, 2010) 
Indeed, some suggest (perhaps overenthusiastically) that the site‘s coverage of the political 
situation in Tunisia served as an immediate catalyst for the fall of that country‘s autocratic regime 
in early 2011, making this ―the first WikiLeaks revolution‖ (Dickinson, 2011). 
WikiLeaks‘ success in generating such substantial attention and support – surpassing many 
more conventional activist organisations – must certainly be attributed in good part to its 
alternatively fearless or reckless publication of state secrets and concomitant attitude towards 
government and corporate authorities. Compared to MoveOn or GetUp, for example, which have 
various personal and organisational ties to the political establishment in their home countries, 
WikiLeaks is positioned far more clearly outside the system, and this ‗outlaw‘ status (also carefully 
cultivated by Assange himself) surely adds to the site‘s public appeal, even to the point of 
romanticisation. However, it also mirrors the disenchantment with ‗politics as usual‘ that is notable 
in many western democracies (as well as, it goes without saying, in most autocratic regimes). 
Statements about WikiLeaks by various political leaders only strengthen this position – so, for 
example, public sentiment towards WikiLeaks in Australia, where only 19% of the population 
support prosecuting Julian Assange for the US cable leaks (Lester, 2011), diverges fundamentally 
from the views of Prime Minister Julia Gillard, who labelled Assange‘s actions as ―grossly 
irresponsible‖ and ―illegal‖ (ABC News Online, 2010) – let alone from those of US Vice President 
Joe Biden, who called Assange a ―high-tech terrorist‖ (MacAskill, 2010). 
This significant difference in appraising WikiLeaks‘ (and Assange‘s) actions may also contribute 
to making participation in supporting the site more attractive for ‗average‘ citizens: it may confer a 
genuine sense of ‗fighting the system‘ by discovering, reading through, sharing, or otherwise 
processing the hitherto hidden information which WikiLeaks has made available – however banal 
and inconsequential its actual contents may in fact turn out to be. Again, the same dynamic was 
likely also at play for participants in The Guardian‘s MPs‘ expenses crowdsourcing project. 
Additionally, of course, the highly controversial nature of WikiLeaks is also designed to maximise 
its media exposure, which in turn again improves its chances of attracting participants. Other c2c 
e-democracy projects, which may employ considerably safer strategies that are designed to 
challenge but not fundamentally offend the overall political system, may fail to garner as much 
media and popular attention – from this perspective, then, WikiLeaks could also be seen as 
another step in a continuing radicalisation of politics, however. 
The palpable (and possibly growing) mistrust of politicians, governments, and the media which 
can today be observed in many nations may give rise to two different tendencies, then – on the 
one hand, a rise in radical opposition to established political frameworks (as also embodied by the 
US Tea Party movement or the UK Independence Party, for example); and on the other hand, a 
growing popular demand for greater transparency in political decision-making. The latter demand is 
addressed, more or less enthusiastically, by a number of governments through ‗open data‘ and 
‗Government 2.0‘ initiatives, but – especially where such initiatives are limited or altogether fail to 
Keynotes 47 
eventuate – has also given rise to the emergence of the ‗leak‘ as a standard mode of public 
communication (Bieber, 2010): both examples of a development towards ―transparency tyranny‖ 
which Trendwatching.com first identified for corporate information (2007). 
WikiLeaks, then, combines these two tendencies by instituting a kind of radical transparency 
tyranny which, building on a wide and diverse network of supporters and operating mainly through 
distributed, bottom-up, c2c structures, advances well beyond the delimited and controlled 
experiments in open data that have been established as top-down, g2c services. Its deliberate 
distance from and opposition to state institutions – indeed, to state institutions around the world, to 
such an extent that it has been possible for Rosen to describe WikiLeaks as ―the world‘s first 
stateless news organization‖ (2010) – has protected the site from government retribution and 
censorship (as Rosen also notes, ―Wikileaks is organized so that if the crackdown comes in one 
country, the servers can be switched on in another‖), but has also made it virtually impossible for 
any more constructive dialogue between citizens and official authorities to be conducted through 
the site. In fact, the radicalisation of some of WikiLeaks‘ supporters – chiefly, the online guerrilla 
forming around the Anonymous activists – makes it difficult to assess whether even WikiLeaks 
itself, and Julian Assange as its nominal leader, are still in control of the dynamic which they have 
set in motion. The network surrounding WikiLeaks may have become too distributed, too 
decentralised. 
Even so, an eventual transition from WikiLeaks‘ radical-oppositional c2c activism stance towards 
a more constructive g4c2c model that does involve some government participation still does not 
seem altogether impossible – if at present highly improbable. The most obvious move in this 
direction is the approval of the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative (IMMI) by the Allþing, the 
Parliament of Iceland (where public opinion and support has been especially positively disposed 
towards WikiLeaks for some time now) – it requires ―the government to introduce a new legislative 
regime to protect and strengthen modern freedom of expression, and the free flow of information in 
Iceland and around the world‖ (IMMI, 2011). Indeed, WikiLeaks representatives were directly 
involved in developing the IMMI legislation, and a company related to WikiLeaks has now been 
founded in Iceland (IceNews, 2010). 
If realised in practice, initiatives such as IMMI may be able to rescue WikiLeaks from its status 
as ‗outlaw‘ outside the social compact of society, by changing that compact itself, and would 
thereby enable governments to engage with the organisation and its followers through other than 
defensive and punitive measures. An official sanctioning of WikiLeaks watchdog activities – 
however unorthodox they may be by our current standards – would have an effect similar to 
previous whistleblower protection laws which cover journalistic publications, but on a much wider, 
societal scale.  
As Stephen Coleman notes, while ―the framing of 20th- century politics by broadcast media led 
to a sense that democracy amounted to the public watching and listening to the political elite 
thinking aloud on its behalf‖, the participative online space of Web 2.0 ―opens up unprecedented 
opportunities for more inclusive public engagement in the deliberation of policy issues‖ (Coleman, 
2005b, p. 209). Conversely, if a gradual legitimisation of WikiLeaks – through the IMMI project or 
other similar initiatives – turns out to be unable to be achieved, it is very likely that in spite of its 
popular support, the site will increasingly be dismissed as a simply disruptive factor which claims to 
work towards a better future, but fails to engage with those political actors who pursue similar goes 
from within the establishment. Such patterns are familiar from previous political upstart movements 
which failed to convert their initial ad hoc support into a long-term strategic mobilisation of 
supporters. 
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2. Lessons from WikiLeaks and the Queensland Floods 
There are a great number of current ‗e-democracy‘ and ‗Government 2.0‘ initiatives around the 
world, many of which pursue goals such as those articulated by the Australian federal 
government‘s Government 2.0 Task Force: 
 ―enhancing government by making our democracy more participatory and informed; 
 improving the quality and responsiveness of service delivery, enabling them to become 
more agile and responsive to users and communities; 
 cultivating and harnessing the enthusiasm of citizens, and allowing users of government 
services greater participation in the design and continuous improvement of public 
services; 
 unlocking the economic and social value of public information as a platform for 
innovation; 
 making public sector agencies more responsive to people‘s needs and concerns; and 
 involving communities of interest and practice outside of the public sector in providing 
diverse expertise, perspectives and input into policy making and policy networks.‖ 
(2009, p. xi-xii) 
The two case studies examined here, however, demonstrate that in pursuing these goals it is 
useful not only to look to the tried-and-tested approaches for building new Websites for 
government-to-citizen or citizen-to-citizen engagement, but also to analyse the rapid ad hoc forms 
of participatory organisation which are forged in a more distributed fashion during acute events, in 
the waters of a major natural disaster or the fires of a global political controversy. What we can 
observe in the Queensland floods and the WikiLeaks cablegate is a largely intuitive and very 
speedy transformation of extant, inherited structures – respectively, of g2c information provision 
and c2c political activism – to address the emerging requirements of urgent communicative crises: 
a transformation which in both cases trends towards the g4c2c model (even if in the case of 
WikiLeaks, especially, a great many hurdles have yet to be overcome). The acuteness of each 
event serves as catalyst and accelerator for this transformation. 
Several specific lessons arise from these two cases (also cf. Bruns & Bahnisch, 2009): 
2.1. Low Hurdles to Participation 
Participation in the initiative by potential supporters is maximised if the hurdles to participation are 
kept as low as possible. In the case of the Queensland floods, while the Queensland Police 
Service was able to use Facebook to post more detailed and complex messages about the current 
situation, it was Twitter with its far more basic communicative infrastructure – where public 
messages are inherently accessible to all users, and hashtags can be used as a simple and 
effective tool for conducting a collective discussion even without a need for users to be followers of 
one another – which was substantially more useful for disseminating these messages. Additionally, 
attempts to complicate the system – for example through the introduction of a more complex 
hashtag system, beyond #qldfloods and #thebigwet – failed: a clear (if tacit) exhortation to 
everyone concerned to keep things simple. Twitter is used in similar ways to support and share 
information about WikiLeaks, of course – and in this case, for better or for worse, even participation 
in acts as previously difficult as orchestrating a DDoS attack against perceived enemies is made 
possible for ‗average‘ users, simply by downloading the necessary software. 
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2.2. Distribute across Multiple Platforms 
Both cases also demonstrate the importance of relying on more than a single point of access (and 
thus, a single point of failure) for effective engagement – especially during moments of crisis, of 
course. Both the key information sites during the Queensland floods and the WikiLeaks site were 
multiply mirrored, on an ad hoc basis, by other participants in order to ensure that a single server 
failure or shutdown cannot bring down the entire network of activities. Similarly, the use of a variety 
of other communications platforms – again including Facebook and Twitter as key components, of 
course, but also the various mainstream media channels used during the floods or acting in 
partnership with WikiLeaks – also enabled potential participants to engage in ways which suited 
their own communicative preferences. However, this multiplatform approach also necessarily 
dilutes the overall message, of course – making it important to be able to respond quickly across 
the different platforms, too (as in the case of the Queensland Police Service‘s ‗Mythbuster‘ 
updates). 
2.3. Generate a Sense of Community 
Even across the different platforms which may be in use, it nonetheless remains important to 
ensure a sense of common aims and intentions. This is most easily possible in the face of a 
common enemy, of course – the floods, or ‗the political establishment‘, in our two case studies –, 
but more generally, too, especially where government or other authorities are involved in citizen 
engagement activities it is important to avoid a ‗citizens vs. authorities‘ stance at any cost. What 
takes place here is ―the pursuit of self-organising, reflexive, common purpose among voluntary co-
subjects, who learn about each other and about the state of play of their interests … [and] the 
emergence of media citizenship‖ (Hartley, 2010). This, of course, is also an important argument in 
favour of the more intermediate government participation of g4c2c models (where authorities 
participate in, but do not own the conversation) over g2c models (where there is a more immediate, 
linear connection between citizens and government). 
2.4. Allow Community Development 
Crucial to the development of both case studies examined here was the relative autonomy of 
distributed participant communities in relation to the participating institutional authorities (such as 
emergency services, or the WikiLeaks leadership group itself). So, for example, it was the wider 
Twitter community which settled on #qldfloods as the predominant hashtag for discussing and 
disseminating flood-related information – and this hashtag was subsequently adopted by the QPS 
and other emergency services, as well as participating media organisations, for their own tweets, 
too. This requires the constant observation of what the wider community of participants are doing 
in their own participative practice, rather than the more detached presence of authorities who see 
their role as mainly providing information to the community, through channels of their own choice; it 
also requires the acknowledgement, and possibly the rewarding, of valuable contributions and 
contributors in the community. On the other hand, an overly hands-off approach to the community, 
as we see practiced by WikiLeaks staff, may result in community dynamics slipping out of reach – 
leading, for example, to the kind of uncontrolled guerrilla cyber-warfare which is practiced by the 
Anonymous group and its sympathisers in the name of, but outside the control of WikiLeaks itself. 
2.5. Earn Social Capital 
What immediately follows from the preceding point is that in the community-driven, distributed 
social media environments we have described here, social capital is earnt, not inherited, even by 
those participants acting on behalf of established authorities. The reason that those tweeting and 
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posting Facebook updates on behalf of the Queensland Police Service were respected by the 
wider social media community following the Queensland flood events was not the inherent status 
of the Queensland Police force in Australian society, nor even perhaps the flood rescue and relief 
activities performed by police officers in the field, but the way that the QPS Twitter and Facebook 
accounts themselves performed: as valuable sources of information; as quick, informative, and 
level-headed respondents taking part in the community discussion; and fellow, equal members of 
both online and local communities. Mere reliance on the overall social clout associated with the 
police service badge would not have produced comparable results. 
These, then, are key lessons which it would also benefit other e-democracy initiatives to learn. 
What remains an open question, by contrast, is the extent to which the nature of these two case 
studies as focussed around acute events has influenced their outcomes. By definition, acute 
events are acute: they focus popular attention and attract potentially large communities of 
participants and contributors, at least for the duration of the event itself. This is necessarily different 
for e-democracy initiatives whose themes and topics are less inherently problematic or 
controversial, and/or unfold over a much longer period of time; here, there could be legitimate fears 
that too much distribution and dispersion of the community of participants across diverse platforms 
and spaces could dilute key community-sustaining processes themselves. However, neither the 
size of the participant community, nor spatial, temporal or topical concentration, are inherent 
guarantees for the success of a citizen engagement project – smaller-scale issues whose timelines 
are less pressing may comfortably be debated by a smaller number of contributors over a longer 
period of time, without necessarily generating outcomes that are any less productive. The five key 
lessons identified above, at any rate, are not time-, topic-, or community-specific. 
At the same time, however, it may be useful to consider the possibility for citizen engagement 
activities in e-democracy projects to be explicitly organised around a series of (at least moderately) 
acute events – to position and highlight key issues and questions as challenges for the community 
in order to concentrate debate and deliberation. Clearly, these would not be as monumental as the 
acute events we have observed here, but even on a much smaller scale this enhanced focus may 
be helpful. Such an organisation cannot be attempted without consultation with the community 
itself, however, and without taking place in the spaces preferred by the community, as any 
perceptions of artificial, top-down interventions by site operators must be avoided in order to 
maintain the g4c2c approach. Should this ‗acute events‘ approach be possible, then it seems likely 
that it would generate a better quality of citizen engagement than merely thematically organised 
approaches to e-democracy that force participants to sign up to centralised spaces. 
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